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The relationship between the Pakistani state and society 
is a complex and evolving one. It continues to be shaped by 
class, national oppression, patriarchy, caste-ism and the 
myriad legacies of colonialism. In his talk, Aasim Sajjad Akhtar 
argues that a classically dichotomized historical materialism is 
insufficient to capture the Pakistani condition. While the class 
structure has evolved considerably between the colonial and 
contemporary periods, the structure of power in Pakistan is 
still centred around patronage ties, even while the underlying 
bases of patron-client relations have been transformed. While 
patronage was based on the control over natural resources 
such as land and water under British colonialism, later regimes 
found themselves patronizing an intermediate class emerging 
out of the subordinate classes. In explaining these shifts, Akhtar 
uses a Gramscian framework of analysis to explore the shifting 
institutional dynamics of the state, the role of capital and the 
evolving bases of patronage within the political economy of 
Pakistan.
It is hard to pick a place to start a lecture on Pakistani 
state and society, in part because the dominant media and 
neo-liberal policy frames affect even what radicals can and 
should say. By this I mean only that I am always tempted to 
dedicate any talk on contemporary Pakistan to a critique of 
mainstream discourses. I think this is extremely important 
in the so-called ‘age of terror’, during which polarization 
between various segments of ‘progressive’ Pakistanis, both 
inside the country and in the diaspora, has become extremely 
acute. It is unfortunate that so many of those who would 
call themselves progressives accede to dominant media and 
policy representations, and in fact wilfully argue for ‘civilising 
forces’ such as NATO and – even more absurdly – the Pakistani 
military, to cleanse society of the ‘infectious disease’ that is 
religious ideology.
 In fact, the endemic diseases that afflict Pakistani 
society are not, as liberals-claiming-to-be-progressives would 
have us believe, of a civilizational or cultural nature. Class, a 
neo-colonial state, national oppression, patriarchy and caste-
ism continue to shape Pakistan’s political economy as they 
have always done, albeit in ever-changing ways. The difference 
between the contemporary period and the heyday of left 
radicalism that persisted through the 1980s is that too many 
of us have ceased to pay attention to these stark and dynamic 
fault lines and, as per the dominant discourse, accepted 
that repelling the challenge of barely modern ‘enemies of 
civilization’ is the most urgent imperative of all. 
 That the millenarian right is as modern a political force 
as any in the contemporary world is accordingly lost in the 
rhetorical clouds that engulf us. Coping with the challenge that 
is the religious right requires us to at least accept this basic 
fact and more generally its sociological foundations, and, if we 
are actually seeking to build a political alternative, the right’s 
obvious blind spots. A dispassionate analysis of the evolution, 
and of the politics of reactionary forces in contemporary 
Pakistan, necessarily means transcending the terribly 
misleading binary that everything secular is progressive and 
everything religious is reactionary. I am not suggesting that 
we be sympathetic to the religious right but only that we 
recognize that the secular right – in the form of the Muttahida 
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Qaumi Movement (MQM), for instance – is every bit of a 
threat to left radicals as the religious right. 
 But I will stop myself here from digressing further. I do 
hope to return to some of these thematic concerns through 
the course of the lecture; in the initial instance I wished only 
to flag what I believe to be broader polemical issues with 
which left radicals should concern themselves. 
 I make no apologies for presenting here a somewhat 
traditional historical materialist analysis of Pakistani state 
and society. I employ a Gramscian framework to elucidate 
my understanding of state and capitalism in Pakistan and the 
modes of politics that have become predominant over the past 
two to three decades. For me, Gramsci is a traditionalist; it is 
another matter altogether that a particular reading of Gramsci 
has come to animate so many ‘post-Marxist’ theoretical 
formulations over the past couple of decades.1 
 Having said that, it is only fair to acknowledge that I 
depart from the birds-eye political economy formulations that 
have long dominated radical discussions of Pakistan. My PhD 
dissertation, from which I draw upon most of the arguments 
that I will present here, was a critical engagement with that 
most famous of Pakistani Marxists, Hamza Alavi, and his 
seminal theory of the over-developed post-colonial state. I 
think it is time that we were able to develop new theoretical 
insights beyond icons like Alavi, because we threaten to 
abandon the very tenets of historical materialism if we 
remain beholden to formulations that represent frontiers of 
knowledge that we have long since crossed. 
 Having said this, Alavi’s formulations have remained 
as influential as they have for as long as they have because 
much of what he wrote is, on the surface at least, still 
relevant. For instance, who would deny the power of the 
‘military-bureaucratic oligarchy’ that Alavi (1972) claimed 
was the most influential of all interest groups in Pakistan by 
virtue of its mediating role? Or the fact that what he called 
the ‘metropolitan bourgeoisie’ – shorthand for economic 
imperialism – remains willing and able to hold state and 
society hostage to its dictates?
 Yet Alavi’s structural Marxism is not able to account for 
much that has changed beneath the surface. His theoretical 
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formulations were relatively static, even though more 
obviously empirical accounts that he penned reflected the 
changing dynamics of power within the ruling bloc (1983; 
1989). 
 However, the lack that I find most glaring is that there 
is no mention within Alavi’s treatise about the working people 
upon whose exploitation the entire structure of power rests. 
Yes, the military, bureaucracy, landed and industrial classes, 
imperialist powers and multinational corporations rule the 
roost in Pakistan, but how is it that a system based on such 
flagrant injustice survives? After all, even the corporate media 
is happy to remind us on a regular basis just how discontented 
a vast majority of ordinary Pakistanis are with what is often 
described as a ‘failed’ – or close to failed – state.
 Indeed, what my experiences both as an academic 
and as an engaged leftist over the past decade and a half have 
confirmed is that Pakistan’s class structure is far more complex 
than is assumed in the classical dichotomies of the historical 
materialist canon . For starters, there is an intermediate strata 
which historically emerged through the development of 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the agrarian economy that is 
now the face of capitalist modernity in Pakistan. To return to 
where I began, it is this class that is the bedrock of the political 
and cultural movements of both the religious and secular 
right.
 Anyone with more than a cursory interest in Pakistan’s 
contemporary political economy must therefore grapple 
with a series of inter-related questions: who constitutes the 
country’s ruling bloc; what political and cultural worlds do the 
variegated intermediate classes inhabit; and, perhaps most 
importantly of all, how and why do the subordinate classes 
consent to the rules of a game that they can never hope to 
win?
 Indeed, beyond academic indulgences, anyone active 
on the left in Pakistan desiring to rebuild a vibrant and 
representative movement of working people, oppressed 
nationalities, women, deprived castes and the many different 
confessional groups outside the pale of ‘official’ Islam must 
confront these questions, and respond to the extremely 
challenging conditions – often encapsulated within the term 
4
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Pakistan’s class structure is far 
more complex than is assumed in 
the classical dichotomies of the 
historical materialist canon. 
‘informalisation’ – within which the most exploited segments 
of Pakistani society live and work.
 It is in this broader political economy context that 
I locate my argument about subordinate class politics in 
contemporary Pakistan. I mentioned earlier that in comparison 
to a bygone era in which the left shaped much of what 
happened in the world, including Pakistan, there is today very 
little emphasis on understanding the structural realities of 
class, state, nation and so on that shape social life. I hasten 
to add that, until the later part of the twentieth century, the 
world and the way in which we understood it was also much 
simpler than what exists today. I will attempt to elucidate this 
complex structural universe by making a series of inter-related 
statements. 
State
The Pakistani state, conceived as a ‘steel frame’ by its British 
makers, formally still resembles the entity that existed 
through the colonial period and in the first few decades after 
decolonization. Beneath the surface, however, many things 
have changed. The insularity of the civil service structure was 
irrevocably altered by the reforms initiated by the Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto regime in 1973, which had a direct impact on the 
class and ethnic composition of civilian state institutions. The 
elite – by which I mean the westernized, secular successors 
of the British – no longer dominate the bureaucracy, which 
is to say that the paternalism and idealism of the colonial 
state has given way to a no-holds-barred use of public 
office for the benefit of parochial groups (Kennedy 1988). 
In short, the civilian side of the steel frame has fragmented, 
and the ‘everyday’ or ‘shadow’ state looks and functions 
quite differently from the formal institutions that dominate 
academic discussions of Pakistan.2 Popular discourse 
does acknowledge the actually existing state, but almost 
completely through the reductionist lens of ‘corruption’. A 
substantial body of scholarship on ‘corruption’ in the post-
colonial world is now available to us, which confirms that 
the surface phenomenon must be understood in its proper 
historical context and with reference to political and economic 
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structures (cf Witsoe 2013; Blundo and Sardan 2006). 
 This is to say that ‘corruption’ is not something cultural 
and in fact has preceded the creation of Pakistan (cf Javid 
2011). For all of its pretensions, the British ‘steel frame’ was 
hardly Weber’s impersonal ideal-type, and the gora sahib3  
anything but the civilized liberal statesman that he claimed 
to be. Yet I want to emphasize that the above-mentioned 
changes in the composition, practice and self-perception of 
civilian state institutions that have taken place over the past 
three to four decades need to be understood in their own 
right. That is to say that the Pakistani state is not the same 
animal that it was, even if many of its fundamental impulses 
continue to harken back to the British Raj.
 In part because of the fragmentation of the civil 
services and for a host of other reasons including the ‘garrison’ 
inheritance of the Pakistani state, the military arm of the 
‘steel frame’ has become the face of the Pakistani structure 
of power. The men in khaki have retained the institutional 
insularity that the civil services have long since lost; they have 
also long been the self-anointed guardians of state ideology.4  
Enough has been written about the military’s dominance – 
and the extent to which it has been undermined over the past 
few years – that I need not go into it here (Zaidi 2014; Akhter 
2014). I am concerned here only with the fact that, insofar 
as the Pakistani state’s power is identified with the military, 
it is a primarily coercive power. Yes, the top brass never tires 
of invoking the fact that the institution is the guardian of the 
country’s ideological frontiers – and this is without doubt a 
defining feature of Pakistan’s political economy – but if we 
are interested in really understanding the dynamism of this 
structure of power, and particularly the forms of the state 
with which the subordinate classes come into contact on a 
daily basis, it is necessary to consider the hypothesis that the 
fragmented civilian – and policing institutions – that are often 
depicted as ‘corrupt’ and even ‘failing’ are the real sites where 
hegemony is fomented. 
Capital 
In the story of modernity, including the peculiarly Pakistani 
version, the history of the state is of course inextricably tied 
6
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...it is necessary to consider the 
hypothesis that the fragmented 
civilian – and policing institutions 
- that are often depicted as 
‘corrupt’ and even ‘failing’ are 
the real sites where hegemony is 
fomented.
to the history of capital. Over the past three to four decades, 
the deepening of capitalist productive and exchange relations 
across the length and breadth of Pakistani society – with 
significant variations, of course – has not been given adequate 
attention by scholars on the left. This is odd, given how we so 
regularly invoke capitalism in our narratives. I dare say that, à 
la Alavi and other classic theorists, we neglect the dynamism 
of capital, including specific modes of politics that evolve 
alongside emergent classes such as the intermediate strata. 
In colonial history we often read about white-collar 
professionals who took up occupations in the government 
service or in private fields such as law, medicine and 
education, and then became active in the anti-colonial 
struggle. In contrast, the demonized bania – or sahurkar5 – 
is never really described as a major political presence. This 
changed in the wake of the Green Revolution of the 1950s and 
1960s, and as processes of informalisation and urbanization 
have intensified, the political role of traders, merchants, 
transporters – what have been called the intermediate classes6  
– has become increasingly pronounced. 
 They have been both a presence on the streets – 
most notoriously during the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) 
agitations that brought down the Bhutto regime in 1977, 
and more generally at the forefront of all ‘Islam in danger’ 
campaigns – and at the polls, with the Pakistan Muslim League 
of Nawaz Sharif arguably the closest thing we have to a party 
that speaks for the urban petty bourgeoisie (alongside much 
more dominant classes). Indeed, it was Sharif and those of his 
ilk, namely the urban intermediate classes and those higher up 
the bourgeois food chain in Punjab, that Zia ul Haq patronized 
heavily, and which gave his regime a veneer of stability. The 
modus operandi was to give them political access to the state 
through local body elections, to complement their growing 
economic presence. 
 In my understanding what is crucial about this 
intermediate stratum is that it dialectically transcends all of 
the binaries that we often adopt in our conceptualization of 
capitalist modernity: state and market; the dominant and 
subordinate classes; informal and formal. So, for instance, it 
is from within the subordinate classes that the intermediate 
7
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...it is from within the subordinate 
classes that the intermediate 
classes emerge, and they 
represent both the possibilities 
of upward mobility offered by 
urbanization and informalisation 
and the ruthlessness of a system... 
classes emerge, and they represent both the possibilities of 
upward mobility offered by urbanization and informalisation 
and the ruthlessness of a system  that can just as quickly 
punish those who do not negotiate state and market well. 
 Looking at Pakistan through the intermediate classes 
is, for me, a way of understanding the dynamic class and social 
structure at large. Too much time is spent in Pakistan decrying 
feudalism, which, as more and more scholars have come to 
accept, detracts from understanding actually existing society 
and the structure of power more specifically. Capitalism 
has seeped into the nooks and crannies of everything, and 
with it culture, politics and economics have changed; it is 
just no longer accurate to depict Pakistan as a ‘backward’ 
society, dominated by the omnipotent British ‘steel frame’ in 
alliance with landed ‘feudals’ that expropriate surplus from a 
predominantly peasant mass. 
Politics
So this brings me to the crux of my argument. The colonial-era 
structure of power in what was primarily a rural society was 
centred upon an insular and all-powerful civil bureaucracy 
distributing patronage through dominant classes with control 
over productive resources such as land and water. The social 
order has since been transformed. Yet I contend – counter-
intuitive though it may seem – that the structure of power in 
today’s Pakistan continues to feature patronage-based politics 
culminating in the state. Who distributes the patronage, 
towards what end, on what basis, and the nature of the state 
compared to its colonial predecessor – all of these facts can 
no longer just be assumed to be as they were. However, 
patronage is still the name of the game.
 The way I want to try and explain this dialectic of 
change and continuity in historical terms – via the Gramscian 
dialectic of coercion and consent – is by taking us back to the 
heady days of the late 1960s and the radical political wave that 
swept both through Pakistan and much of the world. But let 
me first provide some details about the colonial-era political 
order that this wave of radicalism sought to demolish.
 The British fashioned a property rights regime in which 
those who owned land – and other natural resources such 
8
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as forests – were empowered to act as patrons mediating 
between the property-less and the colonial state. The latter 
itself controlled substantial productive forces, most notably 
through its building of massive perennial irrigation networks in 
Punjab as well as upper Sindh.
 This political economy of patronage was all-
encompassing insofar as the state and landed class exercised 
decisive influence over most aspects of social life, including 
basic livelihoods, dispute resolution and social services. It 
was thus that the hallowed institutions of thana and katcheri7  
came to acquire their everyday significance, while ‘traditional’ 
patrons who already exercised significant social power prior 
to the British conquest were further entrenched by the 
legalization of private property. 
 In a nutshell, the landed class was able to secure the 
long-term consent of the propertyless mass on account of 
a peculiarly colonial mix of economic and extra-economic 
coercion. The parochial identities that the colonial state 
happily institutionalized – particularly religion, caste and 
biraderi8 – became cast as perennial markers of native culture, 
and patrons invoked any number of these identities to retain 
control over their economic dependents. 
 There was of course great variation in many aspects of 
this social order across British India, particularly in the areas 
of the subcontinent that were later to constitute Pakistan. In 
the canal colonies of Punjab, for instance, the beneficiary of 
colonial paternalism was not the prototypical big landlord but 
a more modest individual peasant proprietor, whereas the 
exploited classes were distinguished by their hailing from what 
the state designated the ‘non-agricultural castes’. Outside 
of the agrarian heartland of the Indus Valley, property and 
authority forms were distinct, bringing into existence invented 
traditions such as tribal chieftains and maliks.9 
 The British had managed to insulate their patronage-
based political order in the face of emergent contradictions 
but they never faced the magnitude of changes that their 
Pakistani successors had to contend with. By the middle of the 
1960s, the patronage-based order that had prevailed through 
the colonial period was under attack as class, ethnicity, caste 
and just about everything else was politicized. In short, the 
9
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worldview of the subordinate class was transformed – in 
large part due to the efforts of the left – and the politics of 
negotiating sarkar, zamindar and sahurkar10 was now giving 
way to a politics where the state could be captured directly, to 
establish Mazdoor Kissan Raj.11 
 In the event, this did not happen (depending on 
how revolutionary a project one understands the successful 
national liberation struggle in Bangladesh to have been 
– in any case west Pakistan was not the site of successful 
revolutionary upheaval). Further, Zia ul Haq and his coterie of 
generals then presided over the most counter-revolutionary 
period in the country’s history. Pakistan was somewhat 
representative of the global trend inasmuch as the Zia regime 
initiated a process that David Harvey (2005) has called in the 
context of the imperialist countries, ‘the restoration of class 
power’. But there was no prospect – and the generals were 
under no illusion about this – of simply turning back the clock 
and reviving the ‘traditional’ patronage regime. The Green 
Revolution, Gulf migrations and the process of urbanization 
more generally had transformed the predominantly rural 
social order and mandated the working out of new political 
configurations by the state and dominant classes. 
 Of course demobilizing the subordinate classes was 
the crucial imperative, and the Zia junta decided early that 
Islam was going to be the banner under which its whole 
political project would be undertaken. Important members 
of the ancien regime were easily convinced to be part of the 
new dispensation, inasmuch as they had become alienated 
by Bhutto’s populism. Landlords (who never take much 
convincing to join government), industrialists stripped of their 
assets under the nationalization program, a demoralized civil 
bureaucracy – all were happy to become junior partners to the 
generals. 
 But, as I have hinted at above, the regime’s most 
crucial initiative was to get the intermediate classes on 
board. Here I want to point out the symbiotic link between 
the intermediate classes and the religious right that came 
to prominence in this period. The religious right is far from 
just a cultural enforcer: it is a product of immense social and 
economic change, much of which is regional in scope. There 
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is a direct link between the political fortunes of the Islamist 
right and the political economy of drugs and guns — in short 
the whole paraphernalia of imperialist war in and around 
Afghanistan (Akhtar 2011).12  It is no coincidence that traders 
and merchants are the face of ‘defence of Islam’ campaigns, or 
that religio-political organizations receive immense amounts 
of money from the intermediate classes (to complement the 
largesse of the Gulf kingdoms). 
 As such, therefore, the intermediate classes and the 
religious right were the emergent face of the patronage-
based order instituted by the Zia regime. They were the 
new mediators between the subordinate classes and thana/
katcheri. To be sure, they have not so much displaced the 
‘traditional’ landed oligarchy as adapted the particular mode 
of politics that the latter championed throughout the colonial 
period and the first few decades after the country’s creation.
 So, while what we once in the academy called 
‘primordial’ identities are no longer determinants of political 
and social order as they once were, they continue to be 
instrumentalized, but now by a much more diverse set 
of patrons in a complex patronage chain featuring state 
functionaries and market racketeers.  
 What remains to be seen is how the worldview of 
the subordinate classes has evolved as this revived political 
economy of patronage has taken shape. Until now, one could 
be forgiven for interpreting this story in a way that the mass of 
working people appear to be passive participants. In fact, the 
rehabilitation of a waning structure of power during the Zia 
years was a direct response to the consciousness and political 
threat of the subordinate classes. More than three decades 
later a much more diverse ruling bloc continues to wonder if 
and when the working people for whom survival is the name 
of the game will stop acquiescing to the rules of this game. 
But why did they acquiesce? As we know, the Zia regime 
was the most brutal in Pakistan’s history. It demolished the 
left, and how far it went can be gauged by the fact that the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was not spared under the pretext 
that it was an anti-establishment force. Political and cultural 
repression went together; women and religious communities 
cast outside the pale of ‘official Islam’ were almost completely 
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...while what we once in the 
academy called ‘primordial’ 
identities are no longer 
determinants of political and 
social order as they once 
were, they continue to be 
instrumentalized, but now by a 
much more diverse set of patrons 
in a complex patronage chain 
featuring state functionaries and 
market racketeers.
banished from the public realm. 
 Having unleashed the coercive arm of the state upon 
a wide cross-section of society, the junta then proceeded 
to institutionalize a political order that was based on the 
generation of subordinate class consent through state 
functionaries, intermediate classes and the Zia regime’s 
political subjectivity of choice, the religious right. I suggest 
that a wide cross-section of society has imbibed a Gramscian 
‘common sense’ approach to politics, which is to suggest 
both a particular form of political practice – that is to seek 
out patrons as a means of navigating the rigours of state and 
market, formal and informal – and a cynical political imaginary 
to boot. Indeed, one of the crucial successes of the Zia and 
post-Zia regimes is that they have virtually evicted radical 
transformative imaginaries from the intellectual and political 
mainstream. 
 This is simply to say that there is no pretense that 
politics is anything more than getting things done, by hook 
or crook. In fact, the notion that politics can be about 
transforming everyday reality rather than simply trying to 
navigate it finds little traction in everyday discourse. This is not 
to suggest that ideological battles do not take place in what is 
a vast political field. One could argue that ethno-nationalists 
of various stripes do indeed put forward a transformative 
political imaginary, particularly Baloch freedom fighters. Some 
commentators also appear to argue that the militant right-
wing represents a counter-hegemonic politics. I do not share 
this general perception, in large part because the right-wing 
in general – and most right-wing political forces very much 
operate in the mainstream – does not depart from ‘common 
sense’ as I have defined it here. 
 And this is where I will end. Not because there is no 
prospect of change in contemporary Pakistan, but because 
that is a subject for another time. Indeed, Gramscian common 
sense is never one-dimensional; it contains both passive 
elements that produce consent to the established order and 
active elements that encourage radical action to challenge 
it. It is the challenge facing left intellectuals and activists to 
rehabilitate a meaningful radical politics to rekindle the hopes 
of working people that the world can be changed, and that the 
people themselves can change it.
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ENDNOTES
1 Most famously, of course, Laclau and Mouffe (1985).
2 I use both these terms in the tradition of scholars working in 
the Indian context. For “everyday” state, see Fuller and Harriss 
(2001); for “shadow” state, see Harriss-White (2003).
3 Literally, white master. Often used along with the term kala 
sahib, or brown master.
4 It is not possible for me to discuss here the fallouts of the 
“ideology of Pakistan” including state-sponsored jihadists 
turned renegades.
5 The English translation (of both terms) is moneylender.
6 The classic account is that of Kalecki (1969). See also Jha 
(1980) and, most recently, Harriss-White (2003). 
7  Thana: police station; katcheri: local court.
8 Literally, patrilineal lineage.
9 A term used variously to refer to a village/tribal/clan head.
10 Sarkar: government; zamindar: landlord; sahurkar: 
moneylender.
11 Literally, government of workers and peasants.
12 Also in the 1980s, the military expanded its own corporate 
empire, suggesting yet another reason for the symbiotic 
relationship between the religious right and the state (cf 
Siddiqa, 2007).
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